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ABSTRACT
The past decade has seen an increase in ‘platform companies’ functioning as the intermediary 
between workers and customers. The way these companies structure the labour process has sig-
nificant implications for working conditions. In this article, we ask: In what ways does platform work 
in Norway differ from standard employment relationships? And do different employment strate-
gies of platform companies put workers in precarious situations? The article builds on qualitative 
interviews with CEOs of platform companies in Norway, and aims to contribute to the literature 
by formulating a typology of the employment models of platform companies emerging in the 
Nordic countries. The platforms’ employment models are compared to the standard employment 
relationship and precariousness. Finally, the article suggests that institutions matter for why some 
platform companies adopt elements of the standard employment relationships as they appear in 
the Nordic labour market models, and discusses the implications of this.
KEYWORDS
flexibility / nonstandard employment / Nordic labour market model / platform companies /  
platform work / precarization / working conditions
Introduction
Atypical and precarious work have been uppermost on the research agenda in recent years. Together with new technology and new forms of work, platform companies have revived a debate about the future of work and the standard employment rela-
tionship (SER). In contrast to companies offering open-ended full-time contracts, plat-
form companies give rise to pure market relationships where labour is treated more like 
a commodity (Rubery et al. 2018). Platform companies rely on self-employed individu-
als as a workforce, and the companies provide an infrastructure for mediating services 
between customers and workers, reducing transaction costs by outsourcing everything 
from equipment to workforce (Srnicek 2017). Uber is the ideal example – a transporta-
tion company that owns no cars and has no employees. Upwork is another example of a 
company that outsources small office-based tasks to a crowd of workers. Srnicek (2017) 
claims this development to be a return to the ‘piecework’ of early industrial capitalism, 
while De Stefano (2016) refers to it as a ‘just in time workforce’ and ‘commodification 
of labour’. 
The term ‘platform worker’ is used to refer to those working via platform compa-
nies, regardless of their contractual relations. This has also been called crowdwork (De 
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Stefano 2016) and gig work (Wood et al. 2018). To date, there is no legal definition 
of platform work, but the phenomenon shares similarities with atypical work, such as 
on-call, zero-hour contracts or temporary agency work. Similar to temporary agency 
work, platform work constitutes a triangular relationship between a platform, a pro-
vider of labour and a customer, either an individual or a company, which blurs the rights 
and responsibilities in the employment relationship (Dølvik & Jesnes 2017). Stewart 
and Stanford (2017) outline four characteristics of platform work: (1) varying working 
hours and work periods, (2) no furnishing of equipment needed to carry out the job, (3) 
no workplace provided by the company and (4) mediation of tasks by means of digital 
technology (i.e. apps or software). These characteristics suggest that platform work is a 
new form of atypical work. So far, no widespread agreement exists on whether this new 
form of work represents a possibility for earning occasional income with flexibility and 
freedom for the worker, or if it leads to poor working conditions and a more permanent 
precarious position in the labour market (Rubery et al. 2018). This might also depend on 
the workers’ skill level and labour market opportunities, and on the institutional context 
with regard to both country-specific industrial relations regimes (Visser 2009) and type 
of industry in which the platform company operates (Bechter et al. 2012).
In the Nordic countries, platform companies are likely to experience pressure from 
highly organized labour markets, which might limit their spread or change how such 
companies develop (Dølvik & Jesnes 2017). This makes the emergence of platform com-
panies in Nordic countries particularly interesting to study. The Nordic labour market 
models are characterized by low unemployment, an advanced welfare state modelled 
around the binary relationship between employer and employee, strong social partners 
and a centralized collective bargaining system that plays a critical role in regulating 
wages and working conditions (Andersen et al. 2014). Norway, which is the case coun-
try in this article, stands out in a Nordic context with somewhat lower levels of trade 
union density and collective bargaining coverage compared to the other Nordic coun-
tries, but these are still high in a European context. The platform companies also operate 
in industries with low union density or where self-employment is more common, and 
where it might be easier to exploit workers and more difficult to negotiate collective 
agreements (Alsos et al. 2017). Such ‘cracks’ in the Nordic labour market model might 
make platform work detrimental for some already highly pressured industries such as 
cleaning and transportation (Alsos & Trygstad 2018; Hotvedt 2019). 
While platform work is considered to be on the rise internationally (Kässi & 
Lehdonvirta 2016), it remains marginal in the Nordic countries. Research suggests that 
between 0.3% and 2.5% of the working age population in the Nordic countries have 
worked through a platform during the past year (Alsos et al. 2017; Ilsøe & Madsen 
2017; Official Statistics of Finland, 2017; SOU 2017:24). In the UK, a more liberalized 
environment, Pesole et al. (2018) suggest that 4% of the adult population receive 50% 
or more of their monthly income through platforms (p. 19). Together with a rise in zero-
hour contracts, platform work and solo self-employment might contribute to processes 
of normalization of precarious work in Europe (Rubery & Grimshaw 2016). These 
groups, often overlapping, are at a higher risk of in-work poverty (Eurofound 2017). All 
of this makes the emergence of platform companies in a Nordic context a highly topical 
and important issue to study. 
This article explores employment models of platform companies in Norway, with 
the aim of providing a typology of the platform companies emerging in a Nordic context, 
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and assessing the extent to which the employment strategies of platform companies put 
workers in a precarious situation. The research questions are as follows: In what ways 
does platform work in Norway differ from SERs? And do different employment strate-
gies of platform companies put workers in precarious situations? Building on qualita-
tive interviews with CEOs and other managers of 10 platform companies in Norway, 
the article will examine the employment models of platform companies from the CEO/
employer perspective. There are good arguments for interviewing CEOs about their 
business models. First, it is important to explore how platform companies organize and 
distribute work in order to understand the working conditions for platform workers 
and how these differ from SERs. Second, while the business models of some large inter-
national companies are known and researched (see for instance Berg 2016; Wood et al. 
2018), there is a dearth of knowledge on Nordic platforms and on how international 
companies operate in different national contexts. Third, interviews with CEOs/employ-
ers might reveal how they relate to the institutional context and the reasons behind their 
choice of employment model.
The article is organized as follows: First, I explore existing research and theories 
on platform companies, the SER and employer strategies. Second, I outline the data 
and methods on which the article builds. Third, I explore the employment models of 
the platforms with two case studies. Based on this, I introduce a typology of different 
platforms emerging in the Nordic countries, and suggest a few possible explanations 
for why companies mediate work the way they do, as well as some of the implications 
of these models for working conditions. Finally, I summarize the findings and suggest 
further research. 
Background and analytical framework
There is a vast amount of literature on the SER, atypical work and precarious working 
conditions. The literature covering platform work is also growing. The analytical frame-
work of this article draws on selected literature from the following research areas: (1) 
platform companies and challenges to the employment relationship, (2) commodifica-
tion of the SER and (3) employer strategies and the institutional context. 
Platform companies and challenges to the standard employment 
relationship
Literature on platform work describes many differences between platform companies, 
and platform work includes a wide range of tasks and occupations. Foodora, a German 
food-delivery company, is an example of low-skilled work mediated through platforms. 
Upwork is an example of a company mediating medium- to high-skilled office-based 
tasks to a crowd of workers internationally. Howcroft and Bergvall-Kåreborn (2018) 
make a distinction between ‘online task crowdwork’, like that provided by Upwork, and 
‘asset-based services’, like those provided by Uber and Foodora where the drivers and 
couriers use their own cars or bikes for transportation. Within this distinction, there are 
also differences between services provided in local labour markets and those provided 
online (Codagnone et al. 2016). Pongratz (2018) refers to services delivered physically 
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in a local labour market as ‘mobile labour’, whilst services delivered online are referred 
to as ‘online labour’. De Stefano (2016) addresses this difference using the terms ‘work-
on-demand via apps’ and ‘crowdwork’. ‘Crowdwork’ refers to work mediated through 
online platforms, while ‘work-on-demand via apps’ refers to traditional work activi-
ties, such as transport and cleaning. The distinction between crowdwork and work on-
demand is not always clear, as crowdwork is also delivered on demand, and on-demand 
services are dependent on a crowd of workers (Alsos et al. 2017). In this article, the 
terms ‘online’ and ‘local’ are used to highlight where the service is delivered. 
One commonality across the different types of platform companies is that they often 
rely on solo self-employed as a workforce, rather than on employees (Berg 2016). Solo 
self-employed are self-employed without own employees. Although few would regard a 
self-employed person with high skills and a stable high income as precarious, this is not 
necessarily the situation for all platform workers. Most platform workers in the Nordic 
countries are young, low-paid, male and often with an ethnic minority background. The 
platform work that they perform most commonly requires low skills and often serves 
as an occasional source of income (Ilsøe & Madsen 2017). Oppegaard (2018) finds that 
Uber Black drivers in Oslo are immigrants with few prospects of finding another job and 
that they are subject to Uber’s algorithmic control and rely on the income from Uber for 
a living. This indicates that labour market insiders are not necessarily those that perform 
platform work in the Nordic countries (Dølvik & Jesnes 2017). 
Although the platform companies designate their workers as self-employed, this 
is not necessarily the case from a legal point of view (Hotvedt 2019). Platform work-
ers might appear as self-employed in labour statistics and consider themselves as self-
employed, but still, in legal terms, be employees (Ibid.). If there are disagreements about 
their contractual status, workers can take their case to court. In such a case, the court 
can perform its own assessment of the realities in the relationship, referred to as ‘the 
contract-of-employment test’ (Hotvedt 2018a). The Supreme Court of Norway has pre-
viously assessed ambiguous contract relationships, and the key elements that establish 
employer responsibility in these cases are the performance of personal continuous work 
under supervision and control, and in exchange for remuneration (Hotvedt 2018b).
One strand of research describes how platform companies extensively control work 
processes through tools such as algorithms and rating systems, and that legal assess-
ments should take this into consideration (Hotvedt 2016, 2018a; Prassl 2018). Plat-
form companies use data from user registration, ratings and GPS in algorithms that 
manage work processes and job distribution, termed ‘algorithmic management’ (Lee 
et al. 2015). With the use of algorithms and apps in the distribution of platform work, 
Hotvedt (2018a) argues for a careful renewal of the contract-of-employment test. This 
implies that the court should also take account of the business model, and not only the 
individual workers’ dependence on the company. Elements such as control of work per-
formance through customer ratings and platform involvement in the service would be 
central elements in such an assessment (Ibid.).
In the Nordic countries, there are currently no legal proceedings concerning plat-
form workers. The outcome of such legal assessments might also vary from one legal 
regime to another and from platform to platform, which is exemplified by two court 
cases from the UK: while food-couriers in Deliveroo were considered self-employed by 
the Central Arbitration Committee, two Uber drivers were considered workers by the 
London Employment Tribunal (2016). The category of ‘workers’ in British labour law 
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falls between that of self-employed and employees, giving access to some but not all 
employee rights, including paid rest, vacation and minimum pay. The different courts 
emphasized different elements of the relationship. In Aslam and Farrar v Uber, the issue 
of control and supervision by the company was central. In the Deliveroo case, the couri-
ers were considered self-employed because someone else could substitute for a courier 
by taking an assignment. Consequently, collective bargaining rights were denied (Moore 
& Newsome 2018).
Commodification of the standard employment relationship
According to Rubery et al. (2018), the essence of the SER is its substantive protections 
against a pure market relationship where labour is treated as a ‘disposable commodity to 
be bought and sold’ (p. 1). This includes guaranteed wage income, adequate pay, stability 
of employment, fair dismissal procedures, division between work and nonwork periods, 
competence development, adjustments to the needs of individuals (such as illness and 
parental leave), opportunities for workers to voice their opinions and requests, and access 
to social security benefits (Rubery & Grimshaw 2016). In contrast to SERs, precarious 
work is associated with insufficient and variable hours, low pay and limited labour and 
social protection rights. These are characteristics often found in atypical forms of work 
such as zero-hour contracts, part-time and temporary work, and solo self-employment 
and platform work (Rubery et al. 2018). The mentioned categories also often overlap. 
In the study by Rubery et al. (2018), dimensions of decommodification are devel-
oped into the SOFL framework, which describes the idealized SER, and includes the 
following dimensions: (1) security of income, (2) access to opportunity through compe-
tence development, (3) fair treatment through the institutional embedding of employ-
ment rights and voice mechanisms, and (4) recognition of life beyond work through 
regular hours and a clear division between work and nonwork time. Without these 
dimensions, outlined in Table 1, there is a risk of workers being exposed to poor work-
ing conditions and a more permanent precarious position in the labour market.
Table 1 The SOFL framework, simplified version of Rubery et al. (2018: 514)
SOFL SER Precarious work gaps
Security Adequate income during work 
and nonwork periods
Limited access to guaranteed wage income and social 
protection
Opportunity Platform for investment in 
training and career
Exclusion from the SER due to nonstandard life course 
Poor training/career opportunities
Fair treatment Institutional framework for 
rights and voice at work




Division between work and 
nonwork time
Exclusion from the SER due to nonwork commitments. 
Subject to employer flexibility demands. 
The employment relationship protects the worker, the weaker party in the relation-
ship, and the possible consequences for workers lacking the standards provided by the 
employment relationship are many. Rubery and Grimshaw (2016) emphasize the risk 
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of income insecurity and the pressure it places on living standards. Without guaranteed 
income, it is more difficult to plan or obtain credit and housing, and sick leave, vacation 
or parental leave are likely to be cut. Without access to competence building, workers 
may not be able to progress in their work, maintain their position or have access to other 
job opportunities. The division between work and nonwork periods is blurred by the 
constant search for new jobs. Moreover, the fear of loss of employment or hours may 
create a psychologically difficult situation. Institutional systems ensure fair treatment, 
and without them, workers may fear making complaints, as this might lead to a loss 
of work. In addition, regulations on social security may lead to exclusion from social 
protection offered by the welfare state. Rubery et al. (2018) refer to these elements as 
‘precarious work gaps’ (see Table 1).
Alberti et al. (2018) emphasize how managers drive precarization by imposing par-
ticular contracts on workers, and suggest that this might be the case with zero-hour con-
tracts, temporary agency work or platform work. Platform companies often designate 
their workforce as self-employed regardless of the amount of control they exert over the 
working conditions and pay levels (Berg 2016). Moore and Newsome (2018) describe 
the choice to rely on a workforce of self-employed as a transfer of ‘risk and the social 
costs of employment (sick pay, vacation pay and pensions) to the worker’ (p. 478). Con-
tractual arrangements not only determine access to individual labour rights and social 
security, but also to collective labour rights such as the right to collective bargaining and 
the right to strike (De Stefano & Aloisi 2018). 
In the Nordic countries, labour rights and the advanced welfare system are mod-
elled around the binary relationship between an employer and an employee, whereas 
the self-employed (a nonemployee who receives salary) are not covered by the Working 
Environment Act, which covers most working life issues. Table 2 gives an overview of 
the rights and benefits of employees, freelancers and self-employed in Norway. The table 
summarizes how self-employed persons carry the risks associated with the business, and 
thus do not have the same rights and benefits as employees, for instance with regard to 
sick leave, parental leave or paid vacation. Also, in industries where collective agree-
ments are extended to cover all workers, such as in the cleaning industry and hotels and 
restaurants in Norway, the self-employed are not covered. Freelancers have somewhat 
wider access to social security than self-employed (Nergaard & Øistad 2016). 
Table 2 Rights and benefits for employees, freelancers and self-employed in Norway, Altinn 2019 
Rights and benefits Employee Freelancer Self-employed
Sick pay 100 % from 
first day
100% after 16 days, may have 
insurance
75% after 16 days, may have 
insurance 
Occupational pension Yes No No
Unemployment benefits Yes Yes, as employees No, may sign up for insurance
Injury benefits Yes No, may sign up for insurance No, may sign up for insurance
Covered by the Working 
Environment Act 
Yes Depends on the situation No (with the exception of 
provisions on discrimination 
and health and safety)
Collective rights (strike, 
collective bargaining)
Yes Depends on the situation No, due to competition law
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Employer strategies and the institutional context 
From an employer perspective, the need for flexibility in the workforce is central. Some 
of the earliest work on flexibility was Atkinson’s model of the flexible firm (1984). The 
model implies that all companies combine numerical and functional flexibility. Func-
tional flexibility refers to the situation in which one worker can perform many different 
tasks in the company, and becomes part of its core workforce. These workers are usu-
ally permanent employees and receive more training. Numerical flexibility implies that 
the company increases or decreases its workforce according to demand. This creates a 
peripheral workforce with atypical forms of employment and with less training (Atkin-
son 1984). According to Srnicek (2017), platform companies are hyper-outsourced busi-
ness models – in which numerical flexibility seems to be essential. Svalund et al. (2018) 
find that companies in Sweden and Norway use a combination of atypical forms of 
employment in their search for a flexible workforce. Platform work might be a new 
addition to the menu of atypical forms of employment used by companies. 
The literature addressing employment relations suggest several explanations to why 
companies operate differently in diverse institutional contexts. One explanation is that 
the organization of work and form of employment used by a company depend on the 
institutional context and how employment relationships are regulated nationally (Visser 
2009). Bechter et al. (2012) point out that industry-specific traits might be more rel-
evant than country-specific traits with regard to regulating employment relationships. 
As mentioned earlier, this is in line with the findings of Alsos et al. (2017) showing 
that platform companies usually operate in industries with low union density or where 
self-employment is more common, probably to avoid pressure from trade unions and 
other actors, and because in these industries, it is easier to find regulatory loopholes and 
thereby expand. Rasmussen (2018) also suggests that it is easier to regulate platforms 
that mediate work locally rather than online, as well as platforms that fit into exist-
ing industry profiles. One avenue of research also discusses the country-of-origin effect 
(Ferner 1997), whereby a company’s country of origin plays a role in the way work is 
organized in that company, no matter what country it operates in. Alsos and Trygstad 
(2018), on the other hand, found that foreign-owned companies are better at following 
statutory regulations than Norwegian companies, as they try to appear responsible.
There are two particularities of platform companies in the Nordic countries, which 
suggest a distinctive approach to employment models. The first particularity is that some 
of the approximately 30 platforms mediating labour in Norway consider their workers 
as employees and not self-employed (Alsos et al. 2017). Some of the platform workers 
have marginal part-time contracts, that is less than 15 hours per week. Ilsøe et al. (2017) 
argue that marginal part-time contracts might be associated with very low annual 
income and hence precarious work, and according to Eurofound (2017), involuntary 
part-timers are most at risk of in-work poverty. Hence, this new model of employment 
is far from the norm of open-ended full-time contracts. The second particularity is the 
emerging collective agreements with trade unions (Jesnes et al. 2019; Munkholm & 
Schjøler 2018). Examples of this are the collective agreements between the cleaning 
platform company Hilfr and 3F in Denmark, the moped transport company Bzzt and 
the Swedish Transport Workers Union, and the ongoing negotiations for a collective 
agreement between Foodora and the Norwegian Transport Workers Union. All of these 
platforms mediate low-skilled work. However, the white-collar trade union Unionen 
60 Employment Models of Platform Companies in Norway  Kristin Jesnes
also has agreements with Instajobs and Gigstr, whereby the workers are covered by 
regulations for temporary agency workers (Jesnes et al. 2019). These two particulari-
ties might suggest that platform companies in the Nordic countries have a distinctive 
approach to employment models. 
In sum, there is much research describing challenges to the SER but less on how 
platform work emerging in the Nordic countries differs from the SER, why platform 
companies mediate work the way they do and what consequences this might have for 
platform workers in a Nordic setting. 
Data and methods 
Qualitative interviews with CEOs and managers of platform companies provide an impor-
tant insight into how these organizations set the framework for working conditions for 
their platform workers. For instance, when a CEO states that the company does not take 
health and safety into consideration because the company is a ‘marketplace’ instead of 
an employer, this implies significant consequences for the working conditions provided. 
Interviews with CEOs also offer insight into reasons behind the choice of employment 
model. Moreover, the Norwegian context allows us to explore more local platforms, as 
well as how international companies operate in a particular national context. 
The article builds on interviews with 10 CEOs and managers of platform companies 
that mediate work in Norway (Alsos et al. 2017). The selection was based on theoreti-
cal sampling whereby variation in the activity exercised by the platform companies was 
important, as were variations concerning origins of the company, skill-level required for 
the tasks mediated and the location of the services (local or online). The final sample of 
companies was also determined by access. One limitation of the study is that only two 
labour platforms mediating high-skilled work are included, and therefore an in-depth 
analysis of the variation between platforms mediating low-skilled and high-skilled tasks 
was not possible. 
In the final sample (see Table 3), six of the 10 companies have platform workers 
located both in Norway and abroad, and some of the companies have a Nordic profile. 
Two of the 10 companies mediate services online, while one mediates services both 
online and in local labour markets. The companies have both individuals and businesses 
as customers. Most of them operate in the Oslo region or in other large Norwegian cit-
ies. Five of the platforms are registered as companies running web portals or program-
ming services, while the others are registered in more traditional industries, including 
cleaning, transport and manual work. Most of them started their business in Norway 
after 2014 and are newcomers in a Nordic context. 
The interviews were conducted between September 2016 and October 2017. The 
informants were either the CEO or other managers of the platform companies, and the 
interviews lasted from 30 to 90 minutes. Eight interviews were face-to-face, and two 
were by phone or via online webcam. The companies were promised anonymity. The 
interviews were semi-structured, which ensured that the various topics in the interview 
guide were addressed in all the interviews, while at the same time providing the oppor-
tunity to discuss topics in more depth. The interview guide was developed with inspira-
tion from the preparatory work to the Working Environment Act on the employment 
relationship (Ot.prp nr 49 2004–2005, p. 73). The following topics were covered in the 
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interviews: the platform’s business model, the characteristics of the platform workers, 
what characterizes the relationship between the platform companies and the workers, 
and how the platform companies approach issues related to working conditions.
The interviews were analysed in several rounds and with different coding and 
approaches, inspired by both induction and deduction. The first round of coding was 
thematic and based in the topics of the interview guide (Alsos et al. 2017). In the analy-
sis, it became apparent that some companies adopt certain elements of the SER, in com-
bination with characteristics of platform work. The typology of employment models 
therefore emerged from a more inductive approach. This will be elaborated in the find-
ings section, first through a focus on the two ‘exemplar’ employment models, which are 
then supplemented with data from the other companies. After reading literature on pre-
carious work, atypical work and the SER, the SOFL framework of Rubery et al. (2018) 
emerged as a useful tool for analysing the different employment models comparing with 
the SER. Through a more deductive approach, I was able to explore the limitations of 
this framework related to my data material. For instance, the SOFL framework does 
not highlight the characteristics of platform work as described by Stewart and Stanford 
(2017), and hence the characteristics of this type of work in the hybrid model became 
less visible. This is partly countered by highlighting the characteristics of platform work 
throughout the analysis. In addition, health and safety is paid relatively little attention 
in the SOFL framework, but emerges as quite important in platform work, as some of 
the platform companies mediate work that involves risks. 
Findings and analysis
Platform companies are often described as a uniform phenomenon. However, the real-
ity is quite different: platform companies appear considerably diverse in terms of their 
employment relationships and business models. In this section, the similarities and dif-
ferences between platform companies and their employment models in Norway are 
explored through a case description of two platform companies – two opposites – that 
Table 3 Platform companies in the sample and their characteristics
Platform Online/local Skill-level Origin of company
P1 Online High Norwegian
P2 Local Low Norwegian
P3 Local Low International
P4 Local Low International
P5 Local Low Norwegian
P6 Local and online Low Norwegian
P7 Online High International
P8 Local Low Norwegian
P9 Local Low International
P10 Local High Norwegian
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represent the variation in the data material. Roughly speaking, the sample of companies 
can be divided into two groups, and the case studies below serve as representative of 
the two employment models: the typical platform company (case P10) and the hybrid 
platform company (case P4). Thereafter, we compare the employment models with the 
SERs. The first employment model is referred to as the ‘typical’ platform company since 
it is the type of company most strongly associated with platform companies. The second 
employment model is referred to as the ‘hybrid’ platform company since it is a mix of the 
typical platform company and more traditional companies, but with atypical employ-
ment relationships. 
Two employment models
The typical platform company – case P10
Case P10 is a Norwegian company that mediates medium- to high-skilled work in a 
local labour market through a website. The company positions itself as an interme-
diary between customers and providers of work. It identifies with Uber, but operates 
within another industry. The providers of work are considered as self-employed by the 
company. The customers – individuals or companies – contact the firm through the 
website and receive an answer within 5 minutes. The concept is therefore described as 
on demand. The self-employed – referred to as consultants – have profiles with a con-
siderable amount of information and data about themselves, including videos, CVs and 
ratings. This information is used in the distribution of work, to match the customers 
with the workers. The platform company conducts a ‘screening’ of the profile created 
by the consultant, followed by a more regular recruitment process. Uploading a profile 
is free, but when you are given a job, the platform company takes a cut. If a worker’s 
rating is poor, that person might not be able to access new jobs on the platform. The 
company makes this assessment for each situation of low rating. The client customers 
are responsible for complying with the labour law and working time regulations. The 
platform company explains that, as an intermediary, it does not take this responsibility. 
The company does not invest in competence development either. When asked about this, 
the CEO answered, 
‘We do not. That would imply taking on an employer role, and as they are consultants, 
we cannot do that. The training they get is through guides, manuals etc. but it is up to the 
client company to provide the training they need. We have a lot of experienced people who 
do not need training’.
Many of those with profiles on the platform have a permanent position elsewhere but 
work through the platform as an additional job. Each worker sets his or her own wage. 
However, if a platform worker wants to secure an assignment, the hourly rate cannot be 
too high, but nor can it be too low, as the following quote illustrates. 
‘[Platform workers] set a minimum wage and the hourly rate they wish to be paid. Those 
who have a higher minimum wage get fewer requests for jobs’. 
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In this way, the company makes sure that the transaction is relatively profitable for all 
parties. 
The hybrid platform company - case P4 
Case P4 is an international company with a local branch in Norway. The company 
matches customers with workers through an app. The work is repetitive and without 
specific skill requirements. The company perceives itself as an ordinary company that 
uses technology to ‘optimize the process’, and the company also describes itself as ‘data-
driven’. In contrast to the typical platform company, case P4 hires platform workers on 
marginal part-time contracts (fewer than 15 hours per week) with the option of work-
ing extra hours. The CEO describes why the company has chosen marginal part-time 
contracts as follows: 
‘We have chosen permanent employment contracts because it is an advantage to have 
employees. You have a clear responsibility, you may require certain things – that they 
appear at work, that they use certain equipment, that they follow our guidelines’. 
Even though the platform workers are employed and the company provides certain 
equipment needed to do the job, the workers provide most of the equipment themselves. 
Workers are recruited through a more or less ordinary recruitment process, and then 
work is distributed through an app and with the aid of algorithms. A request is matched 
with a platform worker in the vicinity of the requested service. The platform worker 
receives an hourly payment, plus an additional payment for each assignment. The com-
pany does not have rating systems, but the platform workers are organized in teams 
with a team leader who helps to coach the workers. Since the company is ‘data-driven’ in 
the sense that it uses algorithms to match customers and workers, it has a good overview 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the workers. The company puts up rosters through 
the app about two weeks before the shifts, and the workers have the option to request 
certain days and hours. The platform workers are typically young students or migrants. 
Comparison of the two employment models 
The two exemplar employment models represent the typical and the hybrid platform 
company. The typical platform companies consider themselves an intermediary between 
customers and providers of labour or as a marketplace between different user groups, 
not as employers. The platform workers are solo self-employed. About half of the plat-
form companies in the sample correspond to this model. The other half, the hybrid 
platform companies, either hire workers on marginal part-time contracts, or maintain 
a relatively stable relationship with their freelancers or the workers of a company they 
subcontract the work to. These companies have different arrangements for payment 
systems, health and safety and quality assurance; these resemble those of SERs, but they 
also have characteristics differentiating them from the standard employment model. 
Following the characteristics stressed by Stewart and Stanford (2017), both of these 
models differ from more traditional companies in terms of (1) varying working hours 
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and work periods, (2) no furnishing of equipment needed to undertake the job, (3) no 
workplace provided by the company and (4) mediation of tasks by means of digital 
technology. 
Table 4 summarizes the sample of platform companies, their relationship with the 
workers, the origin of the company and the employment model. Some of the platform 
companies in the sample also combine different employment relationships, and these are 
treated as hybrid platform companies in this article. 
Table 4 Characteristics of the platform companies in the sample
Platform
Relations with  
workers






P1 Freelancers Norwegian Hybrid High
P2 
Marginal part-time/solo  
self-employed
Norwegian Hybrid Low
P3 Solo self-employed International Typical Low





P6 Solo self-employed Norwegian Typical Low
P7 Solo self-employed International Typical High
P8 Subcontractor Norwegian Hybrid Low
P9 Solo self-employed International Typical Low
P10 Solo self-employed Norwegian Typical High
Standard employment relationships and platform companies
In the following, the employment models of the platform companies are assessed in light 
of the SER through SOFL framework (Rubery et al. 2018). 
Security 
The security dimension of the employment relationship requires stability of employment 
and income (in both work and nonwork periods), prospects of pay increase and access 
to social protection (Rubery et al. 2018). The typical and the hybrid employment model 
differ in these respects, as the latter gives access to some guaranteed wage income, where 
the typical platform company does not. 
While the typical platform company relies on solo self-employed as a workforce, 
the platform workers in the hybrid platform companies are employees and have a 
guaranteed number of hours per week, open-ended contracts and access to social 
protections such as vacation pay, sick leave etc. The typical platform companies – 
of which Uber is an ideal example – distribute tasks according to demand, and use 
data and algorithms to match customers’ preferences and location (if locally based) 
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with a service provider. One CEO said: ‘We have no employees. We look for people 
who match our customers’ requests’. (P7). The platform workers are self-employed 
persons who bear the risk of their own business. This follows the rhetoric of the 
platforms that they are intermediaries or marketplaces and not employers. Platform 
workers working via the typical platform company therefore have no guaranteed 
wage income, which, if they have no other job, might create substantial pressure on 
living standards. 
Hybrid platform companies, on the other hand, use more traditional employment 
models, giving them more resemblance to companies using atypical working arrange-
ments, as the following quote indicates: 
‘The part-time employees usually have some regular things to do, and it is up to them when 
they want to do them. They can say: ‘I do it Monday or Tuesday’, the regular things’. (P5)
Although the marginal part-timers receive some guaranteed income, Ilsøe et al. (2017) 
argue that marginal part-time work in fact results in a very low annual income and 
thus might lead to a precarious situation. This depends on whether this type of work 
represents an occasional source of income or if it is the main job. The platform workers 
in the hybrid platform companies often have the option of working extra hours, which 
leaves them in a situation very much like zero-hour contracts, which are described as a 
highly commodified and unpredictable employment form (Rubery & Grimshaw 2016). 
In Norway, marginal part-timers have the opportunity to expand the number of hours in 
their contracts, which might give some additional guaranteed income. According to sec-
tion § 14-3-1 of the Working Environment Act, part-time employees who have regularly 
worked more than the hours stated in their contract over the previous 12 months are 
entitled to a contract equivalent to actual working hours.
When it comes to prospects of decent pay, there are differences in the possibilities 
of negotiating on pay for the typical and the hybrid platform companies. The platform 
worker in the typical platform company is paid per task, that is a form of piecework. 
The price is pre-determined by the platform company and the company takes a cut 
of the transaction. This gives the platform worker little opportunity to set the price 
of the service and it limits the possibility for negotiating the price, even though this 
is the norm for self-employed. The following quote illustrates this: ‘We set the price. 
We decide the timing. Customers and providers can choose if they want to do it or 
not’ (CEO, P2). Some platform workers seem to earn quite a lot and others very little, 
depending on the price and numbers of tasks completed as well as skills. In Norway, 
there is no statutory minimum wage and extended collective agreements do not cover 
the self-employed. 
The payment model of the hybrid companies is traditional hourly pay, which pro-
vides workers with a more stable income than payment per assignment. Four of the 
platforms in our sample operate with hourly wages, and these are typically the compa-
nies also using marginal part-time contracts. Still, prices vary considerably according to 
the platform and the skill-level required to perform the job – from NOK 145 per hour 
(about 15 euros) to NOK 700 (about 72 euros), and the pay is unusually low for the 
platform companies mediating work without skill requirements. Platform workers on 
marginal part-time contracts might be covered by collective agreements or extended col-
lective agreements as in the cleaning industry. 
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Opportunity 
In a SER, the employer provides training to ensure competence and career development. 
Lack of access to training may lead to workers not being able to progress, maintain their 
position or get a job elsewhere (Rubery & Grimshaw 2016). 
In general, competence development is limited for workers in both employment 
models, but even less so with the typical platform company. The main task of these 
companies, according to the CEOs, is to match demand and supply through a digital 
platform in the form of an app or a website. Competence development is therefore the 
responsibility of the platform workers themselves, as the following quote indicates.
‘It is the consultants themselves who are responsible for the cost [of training]. There is no 
logical reason why we should pay for it. It is not about employer responsibility. Our busi-
ness model is based on the consultants being responsible for their own development. We 
help by providing an extra sales channel for getting assignments’. (P7)
This is a platform mediating high-skilled work, and the platform workers are expected 
to improve their skills, but at their own expense and responsibility. In platform compa-
nies where the work is repetitive and without skill requirements, the training, if any, can 
consist of listening to a lecture on how the work is done, learning how to provide good 
service or clicking through an online course. ‘They have tools they can click through, but 
it is all voluntary. Nothing is obligatory’. (P1). This usually takes about an hour. 
The hybrid companies might provide some learning and skill development through 
projects of a similar type, but this is also minimal, and might be reserved for the most 
highly skilled. In fact, the complexity of the tasks and the skill level required to perform 
them seems to be more important for competence development than the employment 
model.
Fair treatment
The SER provides an institutional framework for having rights and the possibility of 
voicing issues at work. Without institutional systems that ensure the opportunity to 
voice concerns and safeguard fair treatment, workers might suffer from a fear of making 
complaints or of losing their job (Rubery et al. 2018).
In the platform companies, tasks are distributed through apps or a software system. 
Neither the hybrid nor the typical platform companies offer a workplace that can be a 
reference point for complaining about issues, discussing with colleagues or mobilizing 
on particular issues. However, this opportunity is more accessible for workers that can 
meet in a local labour market. Also, as the CEOs claim, the typical platform company is 
a marketplace in the sense that the platform workers, like other customers, have to call 
support when needing help with tasks. 
The typical platform company also has rating systems that can lead to continuous 
fear of losing the job or additional tasks. When an assignment is performed, the custom-
ers have the opportunity to rate the service. The platform companies use these rating 
mechanisms to ensure quality. Poor ratings from customers can lead to a termination of 
the work relationship, without the platform workers having an opportunity to protest. 
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The following quote illustrates how the rating systems work as a form of quality assur-
ance and control: 
‘Sometimes, if they [the platform workers] continue to get poor ratings, we may have to 
exclude them. This is stated in their contract’. (P3)
In other words, the platform workers might lose the possibility to access jobs if they receive 
poor ratings, and there are few institutional systems through which they can complain. 
Due to competition law, self-employed platform workers do not have access to the 
same collective rights as platform workers in hybrid companies, including collective bar-
gaining and the right to strike (Munkholm & Schjøler 2018). Although the platform 
workers in the hybrid models have atypical working arrangements, they have the right 
to organize and to negotiate collective agreements. However, organizing and negotiating 
require either highly resourceful persons or platform workers that have a stake in the 
job (not only students) and, most likely, support from the trade union. At the time of the 
interviews, none of the platform companies had developed extensive frameworks for 
providing workers with a voice, but there are indications that collective negotiations are 
taking place in several platform companies in a Nordic context today (Jesnes et al. 2019). 
Life beyond work
The SER safeguards life beyond work through regular hours and a clear division between 
work and nonwork time. An employer usually provides due notice of working hours and 
limits the use of on-call or overtime on days off, and especially during unsocial hours 
(Rubery & Grimshaw 2016). 
Both the typical and the hybrid platform companies have a narrative whereby this 
model provides flexibility to the workers, but they appear to remain silent on the pos-
sible risks of instability in payment. In order for platform workers to be entitled to pay-
ment, they must have been offered and accepted a specific assignment. Platform workers 
in typical platform companies might be logged onto the app or search for jobs without 
receiving either jobs or income. The transportation between, or to and from, missions 
is not paid, and this could be considered as unpaid labour. On many of the platforms, 
demand is higher during unsocial hours such as evenings, Saturdays and Sundays, and 
this is when the platform workers usually work. 
The hybrid companies’ provision of marginal part-time contracts implies that they 
to a certain extent recognize workers’ need for security, as the quote below illustrates: 
‘Many want security, and we have chosen to offer this in the form of an employment 
contract. We want to provide both flexibility and stability. We also wanted to avoid the 
judicial grey zone, which often accompanies self-employment. It is easier to hire people, 
even though it implies certain costs’. (CEO, P4)
By using marginal part-time contracts, the hybrid platform companies ensure some divi-
sion between work and nonwork periods. However, those that are dependent on the 
extra hours are also in a situation of waiting for new jobs and are therefore subject to 
employer demands for flexibility. 
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Risks of precarious work? 
Although the employment models of platform companies are associated with a high risk 
of precariousness, the workers are not necessarily in a precarious situation. The model 
indicates that the platform workers might be in a precarious situation if they are depen-
dent upon this form of work. Table 5 summarizes the two employment models and how 
they differ from the SER. 
Table 5 The employment models of platform companies and working conditions
SOFL SER Typical platform  
companies
Hybrid platform  
companies 
Security Stability of  
employment
Solo self-employed Open-ended contract (marginal 




No guaranteed hours. Depends 
on demand and algorithmic 
management
Few guaranteed hours, possibility 
of extra hours
Social security Not covered by Working Environ-
ment Act. Own responsibility. 
Covered by Working Environment 
Act (except freelancers). Access to 
social security measures (Table 2)
Decent pay Little opportunity for wage nego-
tiations. No legal minimum wage. 
Extended collective agreements 
do not cover self-employed. 
Little opportunity for wage 




Low-/high-skilled work have more 
bearing on competence develop-
ment than employment model. 
Low-/high-skilled work have more 
bearing on competence develop-
ment than employment model.
Fair treatment Institutional 
framework 
Algorithmic management. No 
workplace representation  
mechanism. 
Algorithmic management. Work-
place representation mechanisms, 
e.g. safety representative. 
Workplace No workplace, which makes it 
difficult to meet other platform 
workers.
Not necessarily a workplace.
Job stability The rating systems might lead to 
unfair dismissal or fear of such. 
Not necessarily a rating system
Collective rights No right to strike or collective 
bargaining.






No prior notification of jobs.  
Depends on demand. Risk of 
unsocial hours. 
Some guaranteed hours, but still 
subject to employer flexibility. Risk 
of unsocial hours.
Platform companies – both employment models – differ from the SER in several 
ways that lead to a risk of precariousness. These include limited access to guaranteed 
wage income and social protection, lack of opportunities for career development and 
lack of access to institutional frameworks providing workers with collective rights. 
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Platform workers reliant on this form of work are in a precarious situation. This might 
again depend on skill level and how attractive an individual is on the labour market. The 
differences between platform companies mediating high-skilled and low-skilled work 
and the consequences that skill-level has for working conditions are not well reflected 
through this data material and should be explored in further research. 
Nevertheless, the precarious work risks are higher with the typical platform com-
pany than with the hybrid model. The typical platform company has been amply 
described in the existing literature and is characterized by its reliance on self-employed 
persons as a workforce and its use of data and algorithms in its management as a form 
of control. Hybrid platform companies are less explored in the existing literature on 
the platform economy. These companies have the characteristics of platform work as 
defined by Stewart and Stanford (2017): the use of atypical working arrangements with 
varying working hours and work periods, failure to provide the equipment needed to 
undertake the job, lack of a specific workplace and mediation of tasks by means of digi-
tal technology (i.e. apps or software systems). Still, they differ from the typical platform 
companies in the form of employment contract they use, with hybrid companies offering 
wider access to guaranteed wage income and social security. This illustrates that plat-
form companies can achieve flexibility also by adopting certain elements from the SER; 
however, this might still put workers in a precarious situation. 
Why the hybrid employment model? 
Why do some platform companies choose a different employment model than the ‘typi-
cal’ one that relies on self-employment? Two main reasons are mentioned in the inter-
views: (1) the need for flexibility and stability in the workforce, and (2) regulations/
pressure from the trade unions and other regulating actors or legislation. 
The need for flexibility and stability in the workforce is given as a reason for hiring 
people on marginal part-time contracts. This is in line with Atkinson’s (1984) theory of 
the flexible firm, where companies seek a core workforce in addition to flexible work-
ers. However, in the case of hybrid platform companies, the core workforce is reduced 
to a minimum and in the typical platform companies, it does not exist, and flexibility is 
what remains. The latter operate only with peripheral workers. This evokes the image of 
Srnicek (2017) of the typical platform companies as hyper-outsourced business models. 
At the same time, the hybrid platform companies do not seem to be in search of stability, 
but a sort of flexibility without risk. By having workers on marginal part-time contracts, 
the hybrid platform companies obtain the right to instruct the workers to use certain 
equipment and to follow the company’s guidelines in certain periods with high demand, 
without compromising on the need for flexibility. 
The second reason mentioned by the employers suggest that the institutional con-
text is important for the choice of employment model. The CEOs mention pressure from 
regulators and social partners as a reason why they hire platform workers. This includes 
pressure from the legal framework, labour inspectorates and the unions. Hiring mar-
ginal part-timers seems to be an easy way to comply with regulations without having to 
respond to so much pressure from different actors. 
This distinctive approach by platform companies in Norway towards a more tra-
ditional employment model, combined with the few examples of collective negotiations 
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that do exist among platform companies and their respective social partners, might indi-
cate that platform companies are gradually adopting elements of the Nordic labour mar-
ket model such as more SERs with institutional frameworks for collective bargaining. 
However, the part-time contracts offered by the hybrid companies are marginal and 
far from the norm for a permanent full-time contract. Marginal part-time contracts are 
also an atypical form of work associated with major precarious work gaps (Ilsøe et al. 
2017). One might therefore consider, as suggested by Alberti et al. (2018), that hybrid 
platform companies represent yet another employment model driving precarization. The 
spread of both the typical and the hybrid model, together with other forms of atypical 
work, might have detrimental implications for the Nordic model of collective negotia-
tions and bargaining in the affected industries. 
Conclusion
This article provides a typology of the employment models of platform companies 
emerging in a Nordic context. The main difference between the employment models is 
that while the typical platform companies depend on labour from self-employed persons, 
the hybrid platform companies either hire workers on marginal part-time contracts or 
maintain a relatively stable relationship with their workforce. Both employment models 
differ from the SER and can lead to substantial precarious work gaps, as shown through 
the application of the SOFL framework (Rubery et al. 2018). However, the risks are 
higher for those working via the typical platform company. Hybrid platforms allow for 
wider access to guaranteed wage income, social security and other dimensions of the 
standard employment model. The employment model of hybrid platforms still differs 
substantially from the SER (Stewart & Stanford 2017), and the work can be categorized 
as atypical. The employment strategy of the hybrid companies might be a way for com-
panies to avoid regulatory problems while maintaining both flexibility and the possibil-
ity of instructing workers. If these two types of platform companies develop in a Nordic 
context, they might challenge the highly organized labour market, or at least the indus-
tries where they operate. This might further place workers in a precarious situation. 
Why employers choose the hybrid model is an interesting question, both because it 
indicates that platform companies are not reliant on self-employed workers to conduct 
their business, and because it indicates that there are elements in the labour market that 
influence employment strategies. The institutional context seems to be the main reason 
for the Nordic platform companies’ choice of not relying on self-employed workers. The 
data material suggests that platform companies experience pressure from regulators and 
social partners to comply with legislation, and this is partly why the hybrid platform 
company has developed. The development of hybrid platforms as a means for platforms 
to appease regulators and social partners is an important finding, which should have 
implications for the regulation of platforms also outside the Nordic countries. 
This article points to some directions that future research should take. Further 
research on particular companies operating in different institutional contexts and indus-
tries might give support to the explanation provided in this article on how the institu-
tional context has formed employment strategies. It might also shed light on whether 
the platform companies ‘shop’ elements of the Nordic labour market models to conduct 
business as usual without risking their reputation or to be sanctioned against by labour 
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market actors. Future research should also explore other explanations, such as the dif-
ferences in opportunities to regulate online and local platform work (Rasmussen 2018) 
and differences between industries (Bechter et al. 2012). Lastly, research is needed on the 
variations between platform companies mediating high-skilled compared to low-skilled 
work and how they differ with regard to working conditions, as this might be decisive for 
assessing the extent to which platform companies put workers in a precarious situation.
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